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Abstract—We present the design and prototype of an open
source, optical fingerprint reader, called RaspiReader, using
ubiquitous components. RaspiReader, a low-cost and easy to
assemble reader, provides the fingerprint research community
a seamless and simple method for gaining more control over
the sensing component of fingerprint recognition systems. In
particular, we posit that this versatile fingerprint reader will
encourage researchers to explore novel spoof detection methods
that integrate both hardware and software. RaspiReader’s hard-
ware is customized with two cameras for fingerprint acquisition
with one camera providing high contrast, frustrated total internal
reflection (FTIR) images, and the other camera outputting direct
images. Using both of these image streams, we extract comple-
mentary information which, when fused together, results in highly
discriminative features for fingerprint spoof (presentation attack)
detection. Our experimental results demonstrate a marked im-
provement over previous spoof detection methods which rely
only on FTIR images provided by COTS optical readers. Finally,
fingerprint matching experiments between images acquired from
the FTIR output of the RaspiReader and images acquired from
a COTS fingerprint reader verify the interoperability of the
RaspiReader with existing COTS optical readers.
Index Terms—Frustrated Total Internal Reflection (FTIR), Op-
tical Fingerprint Readers, Presentation Attack Detection, Spoof
Detection, Local Binary Pattern (LBP), Color Texture Features
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of the major challenges facing biometric technologyis the growing threat of presentation attacks, commonly
referred to as spoofing1 [1]. In this paper, we are interested
in fingerprint presentation attacks in which a hacker intention-
ally assumes the identity of unsuspecting individuals, called
victims here, through stealing their fingerprints, fabricating
spoofs with the stolen fingerprints, and maliciously attacking
fingerprint recognition systems with the spoofs into identifying
the hacker as the victim2 [2], [3], [4], [5].
The need to prevent presentation attacks is paramount due
to the monumental costs and loss of user privacy associated
with spoofed systems. Consider for example India’s Aadhaar
program which (i) provides benefits and services to an ever
growing population of over 1.17 billion residents through
fingerprint and/or iris recognition [6], [7] and (ii) facilitates
electronic financial transactions through the United Payments
Interface (UPI) [8]. Failure to detect presentation attacks on
J. J. Engelsma, K. Cao and A. K. Jain are with the Department of Computer
Science and Engineering, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, 48824
E-mail: {engelsm7, kaicao, jain}@cse.msu.edu
1In this paper, we use the terms presentation attack and spoof interchange-
ably.
2Presentation attacks can also occur when (i) two individuals are in
collusion or (ii) an individual obfuscates his or her own fingerprints to avoid
recognition [2].
Fig. 1: Prototype of RaspiReader: two images (b, (i)) and (b,
(ii)) of the input fingerprint (a) are captured. The raw direct
image (b, (i)) and the raw, high contrast FTIR image (b, (ii))
both contain useful information for spoof detection. Following
the use of (b, (ii)) for spoof detection, image calibration and
processing are performed on the raw FTIR image to output a
high quality, 500 ppi fingerprint for matching (b, (iii)).
the Aadhaar system could cause the disruption of a commerce
system affecting untold numbers of people. Also consider the
United States Office of Biometric Identity Management (US
OBIM) which is responsible for supporting the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) with biometric identification
services specifically aimed at preventing people who pose a
risk to the United States from entering the country [9]. Failure
to detect spoofs on systems deployed by OBIM could result in
a deadly terrorist attack3. Finally, almost all of us are actively
carrying fingerprint recognition systems embedded within our
personal smart devices. Failure to detect spoof attacks on
smartphones [11] could compromise emails, banking infor-
mation, social media content, personal photos and a plethora
of other confidential information.
In an effort to mitigate the costs associated with presentation
attacks, a number of presentation attack detection techniques
involving both hardware and software have been proposed
3Border control fingerprint recognition systems have already been shown
to be vulnerable to presentation attacks as far back as 2012 when a journalist
successfully spoofed the fingerprint recognition system at the Hong Kong-
China border [10].
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
07
88
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
5 A
ug
 20
17
2Fig. 2: Fingerprint images acquired using the RaspiReader. Images in (a) were collected from a live finger during a single
acquisition. Images in (b) were collected from a spoof finger during a single acquisition. Using features extracted from both
raw image outputs ((i), direct) and ((ii), high-contrast FTIR) of the RaspiReader, our spoof detection algorithms are able to
discriminate between live fingers and spoof fingers. In particular, because the images in (i) and (ii) contain color information,
discriminative color local binary patterns (CLBP) can be extracted for spoof detection. The raw FTIR image output of the
RaspiReader (ii) can be post processed (after spoof detection) to output images suitable for fingerprint matching. Images in
(c) were acquired from the same live finger (a) and spoof finger (b) on a COTS 500 ppi optical reader. The close similarity
between the two images in (c) qualitatively illustrates why current spoof detectors are limited by the low information content,
processed fingerprint images output by COTS readers.
in the literature. Special hardware embedded in fingerprint
readers4 enables capture of features such as heartbeat, thermal
output, blood flow [14], odor [15], and sub-dermal finger char-
acteristics [12], [16], [17] useful for distinguishing a live finger
from a spoof [2], [18], [19], [20]. Presentation attack detection
methods in software are based on extracting textural [21], [22],
[23], [24], [25], anatomical [26], and physiological [27], [28]
features from processed5 fingerprint images which are used in
conjunction with a classifier such as Support Vector Machines
(SVM). Alternatively, a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
can be trained to distinguish a live finger from a spoof [29],
[30], [31].
While hardware and software spoof detection schemes pro-
vide a reasonable starting point for solving the spoof detection
problem, current solutions have a plethora of shortcomings. As
noted in [18], [19], [20] most hardware based approaches can
be easily bypassed by developing very thin spoofs (Fig. 3 (a)),
since heartbeat, thermal output, and blood flow can still be read
from the live human skin behind the thin spoof. Additionally,
some of the characteristics (such as odor and heartbeat)
acquired by the hardware vary tremendously amongst different
4Several fingerprint vendors have developed hardware spoof detection
solutions by employing multispectral imaging, infrared imaging (useful for
sub-dermal finger analysis), and pulse capture to distinguish live fingers from
spoof fingers [12], [13].
5Raw fingerprint images are “processed” (such as RGB to grayscale
conversion, contrast enhancement, and scaling) by COTS readers to boost
matching performance. However, useful spoof detection information (such as
color and/or minute textural abberations) is lost during this processing.
human subjects, making it very difficult to build an adequate
model representative of all live subjects [18], [19].
Spoof detection software solutions have their own lim-
itations. Although the LiveDet 2015 competition reported
state-of-the-art spoof detection software to have an average
accuracy of 95.51% [32], the evaluations were limited to
spoofs fabricated with only six material types. Furthermore,
the spoof detection performance at desired operating points
such as False Detect Rate (FDR) of 0.1% was not reported,
and very limited evaluation was performed to determine the
effects of testing spoof detectors with spoofs fabricated from
materials not seen during training (cross-material evaluation).
In the limited cross material evaluation that was performed,
the rate of spoofs correctly classified as spoofs was shown to
drop from 96.57% to 94.20% [32]. While this slight drop in
accuracy seems promising, without knowing the performance
at field conditions, namely False Detect Rate (FDR) of 0.1%
on a larger collection of unknown materials, the reported
levels of total accuracy should be accepted with caution.
Chugh et al. [31] pushed state-of-the-art fingerprint spoof
detection performance on the LiveDet 2015 dataset from
95.51% average accuracy to 98.61% average accuracy using
a CNN, but they also demonstrated that performance at strict
operating points dropped significantly in some experiments6.
6Chugh et al. reported an average accuracy on the LiveDet 2011 dataset
of 97.41%, however, at a FDR of 1.0%, the TDR was only 90.32%. This
indicates that current state-of-the-art spoof detection systems leave room for
improvement at desired operating points.
3Fig. 3: Example spoof fingers and live fingers in our database. (a) Spoof fingers and (b) live fingers used to acquire both spoof
fingerprint impressions and live fingerprint impressions for conducting the experiments reported in this paper.
Additionally, many other studies have reported up to a three-
fold increase in error when testing spoof detectors on unknown
material types [33], [34], [35].
Because of the less than desired performance of spoof
detection software to adapt to spoofs fabricated from unseen
materials, studies in [36], [37], and [38] developed open-
set recognition classifiers to better detect spoofs fabricated
with novel material types. However, while these classifiers
are able to generalize to spoofs made with new materials
better than closed-set recognition algorithms, their overall
accuracy (approx. 85% - 90%) still does not meet the desired
performance for field deployments.
Given the limitations of state-of-the-art fingerprint presen-
tation attack detection (both in hardware and software), it is
evident that much work remains to be done in developing
robust and generalizable presentation attack detection solu-
tions. We posit that one of the biggest limitations facing the
most successful spoof detection solutions to date (such as use
of textural features [35] and CNNs [29], [30], [31]), is the
processed COTS fingerprint reader images used to train spoof
detectors. In particular, because COTS fingerprint readers
output fingerprint images which have undergone a number
of image processing operations (in an effort to achieve high
matching performance), they are not optimal for fingerprint
spoof detection, since valuable information such as color and
textural aberrations is lost during the image processing opera-
tions. By removing color and minute textural details from the
raw fingerprint images, spoof fingerprint impressions and live
fingerprint impressions (acquired on COTS optical readers)
become very similar (Fig. 2 (c)), even when the physical
live/spoof fingers used to collect the respective fingerprint
impressions appear very different (Fig. 3).
This limitation inherent to many existing spoof detection
solutions motivated us to develop a custom, optical fingerprint
reader, called RaspiReader, with the capability to output 2
raw images (from 2 different cameras) for spoof detection.
By mounting two cameras at appropriate angles to a glass
prism (Fig. 4), one camera is able to capture high contrast
FTIR fingerprint images (useful for both fingerprint spoof
detection and fingerprint matching) (Fig. 2 (ii)), while the other
camera captures direct images of the finger skin in contact with
the platen (useful for fingerprint spoof detection) (Fig. 2 (i)).
Both images of the RaspiReader visually differentiate between
live fingers and spoof fingers much more than the processed
fingerprint images output by COTS fingerprint readers (Fig. 2
(c)).
RaspiReader’s two camera approach is similar to that which
was prescribed by Rowe et al. in [12], [16] where both
an FTIR image and a direct view image were acquired
using different wavelength LEDs, however, the commercial
products developed around the ideas in [12], [16] act as
a proprietary black box outputting only a single processed
composite image of a collection of raw image frames captured
under various wavelengths. As such, fingerprint researchers
cannot implement new spoof detection schemes on the in-
dividual raw frames captured by the reader. Furthermore,
unlike the patented ideas in [12], RaspiReader is built with
ubiquitous components and open source software packages,
enabling fingerprint researchers to very easily prototype their
own RaspiReader, and further customize it with new spoof
detection hardware.
By utilizing the novel hardware of the RaspiReader, we are
able to develop robust fingerprint presentation attack detection
algorithms. In particular, because both image outputs of the
RaspiReader are raw and contain useful color information,
we can extract discriminative color local binary patterns
4Table 1: Primary Components Used to Construct RaspiReader. Total Cost is $165.48
Component Image Name and Description Quantity Cost (USD)1
Raspberry Pi: A single board computer (SBC) with 1.2 GHz 64-bit
quad-core CPU, 1 GB RAM, MicroSDHC storage, and Broadcom
VideoCore IV Graphic card
1 $38.27
Raspberry Pi Camera Module V1: A 5.0 megapixel, 30 frames per
second, fixed focal length camera
2 $22.44
Multi-Camera Adapter: Splits Raspberry Pi camera slot into two slots,
enabling connection of two cameras
1 $49.99
LEDs: white light, 5 mm, 1 watt 3 $0.10
Resistors: 10 kΩ 3 $5.16
Right Angle Prism: Acrylic, 25 mm 1 $16.56
1 All items were purchased for the listed prices on Amazon.com
(CLBP) [39], [40] from each of the image outputs. Our
experimental results demonstrate that the color local binary
patterns from each image contain complementary information
such that when the features are fused together and passed
to a binary SVM classifier, state-of-the-art spoof detection
performance can be achieved. Additionally, by calibrating
and processing the FTIR image output of the RaspiReader
(post spoof detection), we demonstrate that RaspiReader is not
only interoperable with existing COTS optical readers but is
also capable of achieving state-of-the-art fingerprint matching
accuracy. Finally, RaspiReader is cost effective (approx. $165
in total component costs), built with off-the-shelf components
(Table 1), and can be easily assembled and operated by those
with little expertise in hardware, enabling easy integration and
extension of this research (such as adding additional hardware
specifically for spoof detection).
More concisely, the contributions of this research are:
• An open source, easy to assemble, cost effective finger-
print reader, called RaspiReader, capable of producing
fingerprint images useful for spoof detection and that have
sufficient quality for fingerprint matching. The custom
RaspiReader can be easily modified to facilitate presen-
tation attack detection studies.
• A customized fingerprint reader with two cameras for
image acquisition rather than a single camera. Use of
two cameras enables robust fingerprint spoof detection,
since we can extract features from two complementary,
information rich images instead of processed grayscale
images output by traditional COTS optical fingerprint
readers.
• The implementation of a new fingerprint spoof detection
schema through the extraction of highly discriminative
fingerprint spoof detection features (CLBP) using the raw
images of the RaspiReader. Our algorithm delivers state-
of-the-art spoof detection accuracy.
II. RASPIREADER CONSTRUCTION AND CALIBRATION
In this section, the construction of the RaspiReader using
ubiquitous, off-the-shelf components is explained. Addition-
ally, the steps for calibrating and processing the raw FTIR
fingerprint images of the RaspiReader for fingerprint matching
are prescribed.
A. Construction of RaspiReader
The construction of RaspiReader adheres to the following
process. First, an outer casing is electronically modeled using
Meshlab (Fig. 5) [41] and subsequently fabricated using a high
resolution 3D printer [42]. Next, the components enumerated
in Table 1 are assembled together according the the specifica-
tions of the schematic diagram shown in Figure 4. The exact
dimensions of assembly are not critical, however, depending
on the dimensions used, the focal lengths of the two cameras
need to be adjusted to focus on the finger surface as it makes
contact with the acrylic prism.
Because the Raspberry Pi only has a single camera connec-
tion port, a camera port multiplexer is used to enable the use
of multiple cameras on a single Pi [43]. Using the Raspberry
Pi GPIO pins, the code available in [43], and the camera
multiplexer, one can easily extend the Raspberry Pi to use
multiple cameras. Note that an alternative approach that has
been suggested for enabling multiple cameras on the Rasp-
berry Pi is to attach one camera to the Pi’s camera connection
port, and a separate USB web-cam to the Raspberry Pi USB
port. This method was experimented with, however, the frame
5Fig. 4: Schematic illustrating RaspiReader functionality. In-
coming white light from three LEDs enters the prism. Camera
2 receives light rays reflected from the fingerprint ridges only
(light rays are not reflected back from the valleys due to FTIR).
This image from Camera 2, with high contrast between ridges
and valleys can be used for both spoof detection and fingerprint
matching. Camera 1 receives light rays reflected from both
the ridges and valleys. This image from Camera 1 provides
complementary information for spoof detection.
rate of the USB camera is significantly reduced on the Pi due
to the latency in loading images from the USB port to the
Pi’s graphics card. As such, using the camera multiplexer is
recommended.
Once the components of Table 1 have been assembled, and
the camera port multiplexed for two cameras, open source
python libraries [43] can be used to acquire two images from
the fingerprint reader (one raw FTIR fingerprint image and
another raw direct fingerprint image).
B. Fingerprint Image Processing
In order for the RaspiReader to be used for spoof detection,
it must also demonstrate the ability to output high quality
fingerprint images suitable for fingerprint matching. As pre-
viously mentioned, the RaspiReader performs spoof detection
on non-processed, raw fingerprint images. While these raw
images are shown to provide discriminatory information for
spoof detection, they need to be made compatible with pro-
cessed images output by other commercial fingerprint readers.
Fig. 5: Electronic CAD model of the RaspiReader case. The
dimensions here were provided to a 3D printer for fabricating
the prototype.
Fig. 6: Acquiring Image Transformation Parameters. (a) A 3D
printed checkerboard pattern is imaged by the RaspiReader.
In this image, the checkerboard pattern is not frontalized to
the image plane. Therefore, destination coordinate pairs are
defined on a frontalized checkerboard (b) such that perspective
transformation parameters can be estimated to map (a) into
(b). These transformation parameters are subsequently used to
frontalize fingerprint images acquired by RaspiReader for the
purpose of fingerprint matching.
Therefore, after spoof detection, the RaspiReader performs (1)
image enhancement operations and (2) image transformations
on the raw high contrast, FTIR image frames in order to output
high fidelity images compatible with COTS optical fingerprint
readers (Fig. 7).
1) Fingerprint Image Enhancement: Let a raw (unpro-
cessed) FTIR fingerprint image from the RaspiReader be
denoted as FTIRraw. This raw image FTIRraw is first
converted from the RGB color space to grayscale (FTIRgray)
6Fig. 7: Processing a RaspiReader raw FTIR fingerprint image into a 500 ppi fingerprint image compatible for matching with
existing COTS fingerprint readers. (a) The RGB raw FTIR image is first converted to grayscale. (b) Histogram equalization is
performed on the grayscale FTIR image to enhance the contrast between the fingerprint ridges and valleys. (c) The fingerprint
is negated so that the ridges appear dark, and they valleys appear white. (d),(f) Calibration (estimated using the checkerboard
calibration pattern in (e)) is applied to frontalize the fingerprint image to the image plane and down sample (by averaging
neighborhood pixels) to 500 ppi in both the x and y directions.
(Fig. 7 (a)). Then, in order to further contrast the ridges
from the valleys of the fingerprint, histogram equalization is
performed on FTIRgray (Fig. 7 (b)). Finally, FTIRgray is
negated so that the ridges of the fingerprint image are dark,
and the background of the image is white (as are fingerprint
images acquired from COTS readers) (Fig. 7 (c)).
2) Fingerprint Transformation: Following the aforemen-
tioned image processing techniques, the RaspiReader FTIR
fingerprint images are further processed by performing a
perspective transformation (to frontalize the fingerprint to the
image plane) and scaling to 500 ppi (the native resolution of
the RaspiReader images, approx. 900 ppi, was obtained using
a calibration target.) (Fig. 7 (d),(f)).
A perspective transformation is performed using Equation
1, x′y′
1
 = 1
λ
a b cd e f
g h 1
xy
1
 (1)
where x and y are the source coordinates, x′ and y′ are
the transformed coordinates, (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) is the set of
transformation parameters, and λ = gx + hy + 1 is a scale
parameter. In this work, we image a 3D printed checkerboard
pattern (Fig. 7 (e)) to define source and destination coordinate
pairs (Fig. 6) such that the transformation parameters could be
estimated. Once the perspective transformation has been com-
pleted, the image is downsampled (by averaging neighborhood
pixels) to 500 ppi (Fig. 7 (f)).
Upon completion of this entire fingerprint reader assembly
and image processing procedure, the RaspiReader is fully
functional and ready for use in both presentation attack de-
tection and subsequent fingerprint matching.
III. LIVE AND SPOOF FINGERPRINT DATABASE
CONSTRUCTION
To test the utility of the RaspiReader for presentation attack
detection and its interoperability for fingerprint matching,
a database of live and spoof fingerprint impressions was
collected for performing experiments. This database is con-
structed as follows.
Using 7 different materials (Fig. 3 (a)), 66 spoofs were
fabricated. Then, for each of these spoofs, 10 impressions
were captured at varying orientations and pressure on both the
RaspiReader (Rpi) and a COTS 500 ppi optical FTIR finger-
print reader (COTSA). The summary of this data collection
is enumerated in Table 2.
To collect a sufficient variety of live finger data, we enlisted
15 human subjects with different skin colors (Fig. 3 (b)).
Each of these subjects gave 5 finger impressions (at different
orientations and pressures) from all 10 of their fingers on
both the RaspiReader and COTSA 7. A summary of this data
collection is enumerated in Table 3.
In addition to the images of live finger impressions and
spoof finger impressions we collected for conducting spoof
detection experiments, we also verified that for spoofs with
optical properties and/or 3D structural properties too far from
that of live finger skin (Fig. 8), images would not be captured
by the RaspiReader. These “failure to capture” spoofs are
therefore filtered out as attacks before any software based
spoof detection methods need to be performed.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL AND RESULTS
Given the database of live and spoof fingerprint images
collected on both COTSA, and the prototype RaspiReader,
a number of spoof detection experiments are conducted to
demonstrate the value of the raw images from the RaspiReader
for training spoof detectors. In addition, experiments are
7Acquiring a fingerprint on RaspiReader involves the same user interactions
that a COTS optical reader does. A user simply places their finger on an acrylic
prism. Then, LEDs illuminate the finger surface and images are captured from
both cameras over a time period of 1 second (Fig. 1). The only difference
in the acquisition process between a COTS reader and RaspiReader is that
RaspiReader acquires two complementary images of the finger in contact with
the acrylic platen from two separately mounted cameras.
7Table 2: Summary of Spoof1Fingerprints Collected
Material
Number
of
Spoofs2
RPi Direct
Images
RPi FTIR
Images
COTSA
FTIR
Images
Ecoflex 10 100 100 100
Wood Glue 10 100 100 100
Monster Liquid
Latex 10 100 100 100
Liquid Latex
Body Paint 10 100 100 100
Gelatin 10 100 100 100
Silver Coated
Ecoflex 10 100 100 100
Crayola Model
Magic 6 60 60 60
Total 66 660 660 660
1 The spoof materials used to fabricate these spoofs were in accordance
with the approved materials by the IARPA Odin project [1].
2 The spoofs are all of unique fingerprint patterns.
Table 3: Summary of Live Finger Data Collected
Number of
Subjects
Number of
Fingers
RPi Direct
Images
RPi FTIR
Images
COTSA
FTIR
Images
15 150 750 750 750
Fig. 8: Failure to Capture. Several spoofs are unable to be
imaged by the RaspiReader due to their dissimilarity in color
(a, b) and/or lack of 3D friction ridge patterns (c). In particular,
because (a) and (b) are black, all light rays will be absorbed
preventing light rays from reflecting back to the FTIR imaging
sensor. In (c), the lack of depth on the friction ridge patterns
will again prevent the FTIR phenomena. (a) and (b) are both
ecoflex spoofs coated with two different conductive coatings.
(c) is a 2D printed spoof attack.
conducted to demonstrate that fingerprint images from the
RaspiReader are compatible for matching with fingerprint
images acquired from COTSA.
A. Spoof Detection Experiments
In all of our spoof detection experiments, we use a binary
linear SVM for classification8, namely to classify images into
live vs. spoof fingerprints. A binary linear SVM informally
is the hyperplane with the “largest” margin separating the
positive and negative samples (here spoof and live impres-
sions). More formally, this optimal decision boundary can be
found by solving the following unconstrained optimization
8Other classifiers were experimented with such as K-Nearest Neighbor
and Support Vector Machines with various kernels (RBF and Polynomial),
however, linear SVM provided the best results in our experiments.
equation (Eq. 2) given a set of instance label pairs (xi, yi), i =
1, ..., n,xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {−1,+1} and the quadratic hinge loss
function ξ2(w;xi; yi) defined in Equation 3 [44].
min
w
1
2
wTw + C
n∑
i=1
ξ2(w;xi; yi) (2)
ξ2(w;xi; yi) = max(0, 1− yi ·w · (φ(xi) + b))2 (3)
In practice, finding a “large margin” (hyperplane) which
perfectly separates the positive and negative samples is infea-
sible due to noise in the training data. As such, linear SVMs
are relaxed from a “hard margin” SVM (no training sample
misclassifications allowed by the margin) to a “soft margin”
SVM (some training sample misclassifications allowed by
the margin). The number of misclassifications allowed is
dependent upon the user defined parameter C in Equation
2. If C is set very large, then a large penalty incurs for
allowing any training sample misclassifications. Consequently,
a very strict decision boundary is chosen which may not
generalize well to the testing data. In an effort to better
generalize the SVM to the testing data, the value of parameter
C can be reduced. However, if C is reduced too much, the
selected decision boundary may begin to deviate from the
optimal decision boundary for the testing data. Thus, selecting
the appropriate value of C is a tradeoff that needs to be
empirically determined for the dataset on hand. In our case,
we use five-fold cross validation to select the value of C (from
the list of
[
10−5 10−4 ... 104 105
]
) such that the best
performance is achieved in different folds. In our experiments,
the best classification results were achieved with C = 102.
Experiment 1: LBP Features From COTS Acquired Images.
With a classifier selected, we begin our experiments using
grayscale processed fingerprint images acquired from COTSA
(Fig. 9) for training and testing. The purpose of this initial
experiment is to set a baseline performance for spoof detection
when classifiers are trained on grayscale images from COTS
fingerprint readers. In the subsequent experiments, the images
from the RaspiReader are used for training classifiers. This
first experiment is then used as a reference point in demonstrat-
ing the improvements in classification error when RaspiReader
images are used for extracting features rather than images from
a 500 ppi COTS optical fingerprint reader.
Given the reported success of local textural features for
spoof detection in comparison to anatomical or physiolog-
ical features [35], we use the very prevalent grayscale and
rotation invariant local binary patterns (LBP) as features for
this baseline experiment [45]. LBP features are extracted by
constructing a histogram of bit string values determined by
thresholding pixels in the local neighborhoods around each
pixel in the image. Since textures can be present at different
spatial resolutions, parameters R and P are specified in LBP
construction to indicate the length (in pixels) of the neighbor-
hood radius used for selecting pixels and also the number of
neighbors to consider in a local neighborhood. Previous studies
have shown that more than 90% of fundamental textures in
an image can belong to a small subset of binary patterns
called “uniform” textures (local binary patterns containing
8(a) (b)
Fig. 9: Fingerprint images acquired using a 500 ppi COTS
optical fingerprint reader used to conduct a baseline spoof
detection experiment. A live fingerprint impression is shown
in (a). An ecoflex spoof fingerprint impression is shown in (b).
two or fewer 0/1 bit transitions) [45]. Therefore, in line with
previous studies using local binary patterns for fingerprint
spoof detection, we also employ the use of uniform local
binary patterns. More formally, extracting a uniform local
binary pattern for a pixel gc and a set of P neighborhood
pixels
[
g0 g1 ... gP−1 gP
]
selected at radius R from
gc (Fig. 10) as defined in [45] is performed by:
LBPP,R =
{∑P−1
p=0 s(gp − gc), if U(LBPP,R) ≤ 2
P + 1, otherwise
(4)
where,
U(LBPP,R) =| s(gP−1 − gc)− s(g0 − gc) |
+
P−1∑
p=1
| s(gp − gc)− s(gp−1 − gc) | (5)
and
s(x) =
{
1 if x ≥ 0
0 if x < 0
(6)
Finally, let HP,R be the uniform local binary pattern his-
togram constructed by binning the local binary patterns for
each pixel gc in an image according to equations 4, 5, and 6
using P and R as parameters to the LBP feature extractor. In
our experiments, we extract H8,1, H16,2, and H24,3 in order
to capture textures at different spatial resolutions. These his-
tograms (each having P +2 bins) are individually normalized
and concatenated into a single feature vector x of dimension
54.
Using the live and spoof finger images from COTSA
as described in Tables 2 and 3, five-fold cross validation
is used to partition training and testing splits in the data.
When partitioning each fold of the live fingers, the finger
impressions from 12 subjects are used for training, and the
finger impressions from the remaining 3 subjects are used for
Fig. 10: Circularly symmetric isotropic neighbor sets for
different values of (P, R), used for the extraction of LBP.
Figure reproduced from [45].
testing. When partitioning spoof finger impressions, 80% of
the impressions for each spoof material are used for training,
and the other 20% for testing.
Next, a feature vector x is extracted from every image in the
training and testing splits and used to train and test a binary
linear SVM according to the parameters previously described.
Using the proposed classification scheme and training/testing
splits, we report a mean (over five folds) True Detection Rate
(TDR) of 58.33% at a False Detection Rate (FDR) of 0.1%.
Additionally, we report the standard deviation for the TDR
(over five folds) to be 37.69%.
Not only is the performance of this baseline classifier
unacceptably low, it is also not robust, as evidenced by the ex-
tremely high standard deviation of the TDR over the five folds.
Furthermore, it demonstrates that 500 ppi processed grayscale
fingerprint images from COTS FTIR fingerprint readers have
relatively low information content for discriminating spoof
fingers from live fingers. This serves as motivation for de-
veloping the RaspiReader to output two raw RGB images
for spoof detection. In the subsequent sections, we perform
experiments on the RaspiReader images and demonstrate that
the performance of classifiers trained with RaspiReader images
far surpass the performance of classifiers trained on processed
grayscale images.
Experiment 2: Color LBP Features Extracted from
RaspiReader Raw FTIR Images. In this experiment, we make
use of the information rich, raw FTIR images from the
RaspiReader (Fig. 11) for presentation attack detection. As
with the experiment 1, we again pursue the use of LBP textural
features given their superior performance in comparison with
other types of features that have been tried for fingerprint spoof
detection [35]. However, since the raw FTIR images from the
RaspiReader contain color information, rather than using the
traditional grayscale LBP features, we employ the use of color
local binary patterns (CLBP). Previous works have shown the
9(a) (b)
Fig. 11: Raw FTIR fingerprint images acquired using the
RaspiReader fingerprint reader and used to conduct spoof
detection Experiment 2. A live fingerprint impression is shown
in (a). An ecoflex spoof fingerprint impression is shown in (b).
efficacy of CLBP for both face recognition and face spoof
detection [39], [40]. However, because fingerprint images from
COTS fingerprint readers are grayscale, CLBP features have,
to our knowledge, not been investigated for use in fingerprint
spoof detection until now.
Unlike traditional grayscale LBP patterns, color local bi-
nary patterns (CLBP) encode discriminative spatiochromatic
textures from across multiple spectral channels [39]. In other
words, CLBP extracts textures across all the different image
bands (HSV used here) in a given input image. More formally,
given an input image I with K spectral channels, let the set
of all spectral channels for I be defined as S = {S1, ..., SK}.
Then, the CLBP feature x can be extracted using algorithm
1. Note that HP,R(gc, gN ) returns a normalized histogram
Algorithm 1 Extraction of Color Local Binary Patterns
x← [ ]
for i← 1,K do
for j ← 1,K do
x← x‖H8,1(Si, Sj)‖H16,2(Si, Sj)‖H24,3(Si, Sj)
end for
end for
return x
of local binary patterns using gc as the image channel that
the center (thresholding) pixels are selected from, and gN
as the image channel from which the neighborhood pixels
are selected from in the computation of LBP as defined in
equations 4, 5, and 6. Also, ‖ indicates vector concatenation.
This extraction of CLBP features is also visually presented in
Figure 12.
Using the live and spoof finger images from the
RaspiReader’s FTIR camera as described in Tables 2 and 3,
five-fold cross validation is again used to partition training and
testing splits. Then, we (i) convert each image to the HSV9
color space and (ii) extract 486 dimensional CLBP features
from each image to train/test a binary linear SVM. With this
proposed classification scheme and training/testing data, we
report a mean (over five folds) True Detection Rate (TDR) of
90.75% at a False Detection Rate (FDR) of 0.1%. Additionally,
we report the standard deviation for the TDR (over five folds)
to be 8.88%.
To better understand which presentation attacks the spoof
detector has a difficult time detecting using the proposed
CLBP features and also how well the detector classifies live
fingers, we report the mean (over five folds) correct detection
rate for live fingers and spoofs (of every material) individually
(Table 4). From these results, we can see that that most difficult
Table 4: Correct Detection Rates1on Live Fingers and Individual
Spoof Materials Using RaspiReader Raw FTIR Images
Finger Type Correct Detection Rate(µ± σ)
Live Finger 95.07%± 8.12
Ecoflex 95.0%± 5.0
Wood Glue 96.0%± 6.52
Monster Liquid Latex 100.0%± 0.0
Liquid Latex Body Paint 98.0%± 4.47
Gelatin 100.0%± 0.0
Silver Coated Ecoflex 100.0%± 0.0
Crayola Model Magic 100.0%± 0.0
1 The mean and standard deviation is reported for the correct detection
rates over 5-folds, using 0.5 as a threshold (where scores range from
0-1).
spoofs to detect using the CLBP features extracted from the
RaspiReader raw FTIR images are ecoflex spoofs. This is to
be expected since the ecoflex spoofs are quite thin. As such,
much of the human skin color texture passes through the spoof
material, making the spoof impression of similar color to live
finger impressions (Fig. 15 (a)). We can also see from these
results that the detector correctly classifies spoof fingers at
a higher rate than live fingers. This is likely due to a small
dataset of live fingers (only 15 human subjects provided live
fingerprints) used during the training of the spoof detector.
Given a larger number of live finger impressions to train on,
the detection rates of live fingers will likely improve.
Overall, in comparison to the baseline classifier (trained
on grayscale LBP features extracted from processed images
from a COTS fingerprint reader), this classifier (trained on
CLBP features extracted from raw FTIR images from the
RaspiReader) achieves significant improvement (90.75% mean
TDR compared to 58.33% mean TDR both at FDR of 0.1%).
This huge jump in TDR from the baseline classifier at the
same fixed FDR (0.1%) demonstrates the usefulness of the
raw FTIR images from the RaspiReader for fingerprint spoof
detection. In particular, because the raw FTIR images from
the RaspiReader contain color information, we are able to
extract color textural (CLBP) features which are much more
discriminative than traditional grayscale textural features.
9Other color spaces were experimented with, but HSV consistently provided
the highest performance. This is likely because HSV separates the luminance
and chrominance components in an image, allowing extraction of LBP features
on more complementary image channels (Fig. 14).
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Fig. 12: Illustration of the extraction of the color LBP features from a spoof fingerprint impression captured by the RaspiReader.
First, the fingerprint images from the RaspiReader are converted from the RGB color space to the HSV color space. Then,
LBP as defined in equations 4, 5, and 6 is applied to (i) each individual channel of an image (a, b, c), and (ii) across opponent
channels (e.g. a center pixel is taken from one channel and the neighborhood pixels are taken from another channel)(d, e, f,
g, h, i). Finally, each of these LBP histograms are normalized and concatenated into a single feature vector. Note, the green
squares illustrate the location of a center pixel and the red circles illustrate the location of neighboring pixels during each LBP
extraction.
However, a TDR of 90.75% still leaves much room for im-
provement, especially if the proposed spoof detection scheme
were to be installed in the field where a 9.25% miss rate could
prove very costly. Therefore, in the following experiment, we
attempt to achieve even higher performance by using the direct
image output of the RaspiReader for spoof detection.
Experiment 3: Color LBP Extracted From RaspiReader Raw
Direct Images. To perform this experiment, we essentially re-
peat the entire structure of Experiment 2. However, instead of
extracting CLBP features from the raw FTIR image output of
the RaspiReader, 486 dimensional CLBP features are instead
extracted from the direct image output of the RaspiReader
(Fig. 13).
Using the SVM classifier with the same parameters and 5-
fold cross validation training/testing data, we report a mean
(over five folds) TDR of 92.88% at a FDR of 0.1% (a slight
improvement over the results of Experiment 2). Additionally,
we report the standard deviation for the TDR to be 10.97%.
As in Experiment 2, we report the correct detection rates for
live fingers and each individual spoof material separately to
better determine how well the classifier correctly detects live
fingers and each respective spoof type (Table 5).
From these results we can see that ecoflex spoofs are again
the most difficult spoof type for RaspiReader to defend against
since very thin clear spoofs allow much of the human skin
Table 5: Correct Detection Rates1on Live Fingers and Individual
Spoof Materials Using RaspiReader Raw Direct Images
Finger Type Correct Detection Rate(µ± σ)
Live Finger 98.8%± 1.79
Ecoflex 95.0%± 8.66
Wood Glue 99.0%± 2.24
Monster Liquid Latex 100.0%± 0.0
Liquid Latex Body Paint 100.0%± 0.0
Gelatin 99.0%± 2.24
Silver Coated Ecoflex 100.0%± 0.0
Crayola Model Magic 98.33%± 3.73
1 The mean and standard deviation is reported for the correct detection
rates over 5-folds, using 0.5 as a threshold (where scores range from
0-1).
color behind the spoof to pass through (Fig. 15 (b)). Also, in
these direct images, if the surface area of the spoof is smaller
than the surface area of the finger presenting the spoof (Fig. 15
(b)), much of the peripheral surface area of the live finger will
be included in the spoof images used to make a classification
decision, confusing the classifier. In the future, we plan to
solve this problem by collecting more spoof impressions from
thin clear spoofs, enabling us to better learn the more subtle
differences between thin clear spoofs and live fingers. We can
also see from these results that using the direct images of
the RaspiReader enables higher correct detection rates of live
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(a) (b)
Fig. 13: Raw direct fingerprint images acquired using the
RaspiReader and used to conduct spoof detection Experiment
3. A live fingerprint impression is shown in (a). An ecoflex
spoof fingerprint impression is shown in (b).
(a) (b)
Fig. 14: Direct fingerprint images acquired using the
RaspiReader and converted to the HSV color space. A live
fingerprint impression is shown in (a). An ecoflex spoof
fingerprint impression is shown in (b).
fingers than the raw FTIR images do. This is likely because the
raw direct images contain less variability amongst the various
fingers than the raw FTIR images do. As such, the small
amount of live finger training data does not affect performance
as much in Experiment 3 as it does in Experiment 2.
Finally, even at a TDR of 92.88% in this experiment,
there is still room for improvement. Therefore, in the final
spoof detection experiment, we extract features from both of
(a) (b)
Fig. 15: (a) Raw FTIR Image of an ecoflex spoof classified as
live finger in Experiment 2. (b) Raw Direct Image of an ecoflex
spoof classified as live finger in Experiment 3. Ecoflex is the
most difficult spoof type for RaspiReader to defend against
since human finger skin color passes through the clear, thin
material.
the RaspiReader images from camera-1 and camera-2 and
concatenate them together in an attempt to achieve even higher
and more robust spoof detection performance.
Experiment 4: Fusion of Color LBP Features. In this penul-
timate spoof detection experiment, we extract CLBP features
from both image outputs of the RaspiReader (raw FTIR output
and raw direct output). These two CLBP features are then
fused into a single 972 dimensional feature vector and used
to train a binary linear SVM.
Using this classification scheme, we report a mean (over
five folds) TDR of 95.3% at a FDR of 0.1%. The standard
deviation over the five folds was 6.05%. By fusing CLBP
features extracted from both the raw FTIR output of the
RaspiReader and the direct output of the RaspiReader, we
boost the classification performance beyond the performance
when only a single image output from RaspiReader is used
for spoof detection. This indicates that using two cameras for
fingerprint image acquisition and subsequent spoof detection
is advantageous, since they both contain complementary and
discriminative spoof detection information.
In summary, we have demonstrated in these spoof detection
experiments that both raw images generated by our custom
RaspiReader contain far more discriminative information for
spoof detection than grayscale images output by COTS optical
fingerprint readers. In addition, we have shown that these
images contain complementary information such that when
simple CLBP features extracted from each image are fused to-
gether, state-of-the-art spoof detection performance on known
materials can be achieved. By showing that the RaspiReader
images are far more useful for spoof detection than grayscale
COTS optical images and by open sourcing the design of
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RaspiReader, we have removed what we posit to be one of the
biggest limitations facing current state-of-the-art presentation
attack detection schemes (namely low information processed
images on which these detectors are trained). A full summary
of these spoof detection experiment results is listed in Table
6.
Table 6: Summary of Spoof Detection Experiments
Method
TDR @ FDR = 0.1%
µ± σ1 Detection Time (msecs)
2
COTSA
+ LBP 58.33%± 37.69 236
Rpi FTIR
+ CLBP 90.75%± 8.88 243
Rpi Direct
+ CLBP 92.88%± 10.97 243
Rpi Fusion
+ CLBP 95.30%± 6.05 486
1 These results are reported over 5-folds.
2 The LBP and CLBP feature extractions and SVM classifications
were performed with a single CPU core on a Macbook Pro running
a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5 processor with 8 GB of RAM. In the future,
we will parallelize the feature extractions and directly run the spoof
detection algorithm on the Raspberry Pi controlling the RaspiReader.
B. Interoperability of RaspiReader
In addition to demonstrating the usefulness of the
RaspiReader images for fingerprint spoof detection, we also
demonstrate that by processing the RaspiReader FTIR images,
we can output images which are compatible for matching with
images from COTS fingerprint readers. Previously, we dis-
cussed how to process and transform a RaspiReader raw FTIR
image into an image suitable for matching. In this experiment,
we evaluate the matching performance (of 11,175 imposter
pairs and 6750 genuine pairs) when using (i) the RaspiReader
processed images as both the enrollment and probe images, (ii)
the COTSA images as both the enrollment and probe images,
and (iii) the COTSA images as the enrollment images and
the RaspiReader processed images as the probe images. The
results for these matching experiments are listed in Table 7.
Table 7: Fingerprint Matching Results
Enrollment Reader Probe Reader TAR @ FAR = 0.1%
COTSA COTSA 98.62%
RaspiReader RaspiReader 99.21%
COTSA RaspiReader 95.56%
From these results, we make two observations. First, the best
performance is achieved for native comparisons, where the en-
rolled and search (probe) image are produced by the same cap-
ture device. RaspiReader’s native performance is slightly better
than that of COTSA. This indicates that the RaspiReader is
capable of outputting images which are compatible with state
of the art fingerprint matchers10. Second, we note that the
performance does drop slightly when conducting the interop-
erability experiment (COTSA is used for enrollment images
and RaspiReader is used for probe images). However, the
matching performance is still quite high considering the very
10We use the Innovatrics fingerprint SDK since we recently acquired this
matcher, and it is shown to have high accuracy in the NIST FpVTE evaluation
[46].
stringent operating point (FAR = 0.1%). Furthermore, studies
have shown that when different fingerprint readers are used for
enrollment and subsequent verification or identification, the
matching performance indeed drops [47], [48], [49]. Finally,
we are currently investigating other approaches for processing
and downsampling RaspiReader images to reduce some of the
drop in cross-reader performance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have designed and prototyped a custom fingerprint
reader, called RaspiReader, with ubiquitous components. This
fingerprint reader is both low cost and easy to assemble,
enabling other researchers to easily and seamlessly develop
their own novel fingerprint presentation attack detection solu-
tions which use both hardware and software. By customizing
RaspiReader with two cameras for fingerprint image acquisi-
tion rather than one, we were able to extract discriminative
color local binary patterns (CLBP) from both raw images
which, when fused together, enabled us to match the perfor-
mance of state of the art spoof detection methods (CNN). Fi-
nally, by processing the raw FTIR images of the RaspiReader,
we were able to output fingerprint images compatible for
matching with COTS optical fingerprint readers.
In our ongoing work, we plan to integrate specialized hard-
ware into RaspiReader such as Optical Coherence Tomography
(OCT) for sub-dermal imagery, IR cameras for vein detection,
or microscopes for extremely high resolution images of the
fingerprint. Because the RaspiReader uses ubiquitous com-
ponents running open source software, RaspiReader enables
future integration of these additional hardware components.
In addition to the integration of specialized hardware, we
also plan to use the raw, information rich images from the
RaspiReader to pursue one-class classification schemes for
fingerprint spoof detection. In particular, we posit that the
RaspiReader images will assist us in modeling the class of
live fingerprint images, such that spoofs of all material types
can be easily rejected.
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